2015年05月



【朝刊 1面】
【あめりかノート】古森義久 「日本研究者」の正体とは

 米国の日本研究者とは一体なんなのか。日本の国のあり方や国民の心の持ち方を高所から指示する役割を自任する人たちなのか。5月上旬に出された米国の日本研究者ら「187人の声明」を読んで感じる疑問である。

 この一文は「日本の歴史家を支持する声明」とされていたが、「日本の歴史家」が誰かは不明、日本政府や国民への一方的な説教めいた内容だった。


 声明は日本の民主主義や政治的寛容など自明の現実をことさら称賛しながらも、慰安婦問題などを取りあげて「過去の過ちの偏見なき清算」をせよ、と叱責する。安倍晋三首相に対しては「過去に日本が他国に与えた苦痛を直視することを促す」と指示する。


 英語と日本語の両方で出た同声明は原語の「促す(urge)」という言葉を日本語版では「期待する」などと薄めているが、核心は自分たちの思考の日本側への押しつけである。この点では連合国軍総司令部(GHQ)もどきの思想警察までを連想させる。


 だが発信者とされる187人には「米国の日本研究者」とは異なるような人物たちも多い。安倍政権非難の活動に熱心な日本在住のアイルランド人フリー記者 や性転換者の権利主張の運動に専念する在米の日本人活動家、作家、映画監督らも名を連ねる。中国系、韓国系そして日本と、アジア系の名も40ほどに達す る。


 そんな多様性も米国学界の特徴かもしれないが、同声明が米国全体からみれば極端な政治傾向の人物たちの主導で発せられた点も銘記すべきである。


 声明作成の中心となったコネティカット大学教授のアレクシス・ダデン氏は日本の尖閣や竹島の領有権主張を膨張主義と非難し、安倍首相を「軍国主義者」と か「裸の王様」とののしってきた。マサチューセッツ工科大学名誉教授のジョン・ダワー氏は日本の天皇制を批判し、日米同盟の強化も危険だと断じてきた。コ ロンビア大学教授のキャロル・グラック氏は朝日新聞が過ちだと認めた慰安婦問題記事の筆者の植村隆氏の米国での弁解宣伝を全面支援している。


 要するにこれら「米国の日本研究者」たちは米国の多数派の対日認識を含む政治傾向や歴代政権の日本への政策や態度よりもはるかに左の端に立つ過激派なのである。


 だが今回の声明の実質部分で最も注視すべきなのは、これら米側研究者たちが慰安婦問題での年来の虚構の主張をほぼ全面的に撤回した点だった。「日本軍の組織的な強制連行による20万人女性の性的奴隷化」という年来の糾弾用語がみな消えてしまったのだ。


 同声明は日本軍の慰安婦への関与の度合いは諸見解があるとして、「強制連行」という言葉を使っていない。慰安婦の人数も諸説あるとして、「20万人」という数字も記していない。「性奴隷」との言葉も出てこないのだ。


 声明は慰安婦問題について具体的な事実よりも女性たちが自己の意思に反する行為をさせられたという「広い文脈」をみろともいう。このへんは朝日新聞のす り替えと酷似している。やはり日本側からの事実の指摘がついに効果をあげ始めたといえようか。 (ワシントン駐在客員特派員)


歴史問題については以下のような記事をウォールストリート・ジャーナルに寄稿したこともあります。

もうとっくに済んでいるのだ、という結論でした。

古い話で、ちょうど10年前です。

いまの論議もみなこの手の話の蒸し返しなのです。

For the Asian Wall Street Journal

 

April 28, 2005

                                                                 Time to Move On

By Yoshihisa Komori

Editor-at-Large and

Former China Bureau Chief

The Sankei Shimbun

 

It must be agonizing to be a Japanese Prime Minister when it comes to dealing with China over the so-called “history issue.”  He must respond to belligerent Chinese demands by apologizing for events in a previous century, as if none of his numerous predecessors had ever apologized, although in fact every single one of them did.  Sadly, he will find his apology is never enough; instead of acceptance, the Chinese will raise the bar, adding never-ending vague demands and additional conditions —“apology must be based on genuine remorse” or “accompanied by actions.”  Then he will patiently listen to the lectures denouncing Japan’s “militarism” past and present, by leaders of the same regime whose militancy has caused widespread international concern.

 

This is the plight in which Prime Minister.Junichiro Koizumi found himself when he issued the latest apology for Japan’s past aggression in a speech at the Asian-African summit in Indonesia last week.  Sure enough, he was told by Chinese President Hu Jintao in a two-some meeting the next day that Japan’s remorse must result in “sincere activities,” making clear the pattern that Japan’s apology as China initially demanded would not be enough.  In contrast, Mr. Koizumi did not seek a Chinese apology or compensation for damages the Chinese government allowed violent demonstrators to inflict on Japanese diplomatic and commercial facilities in China.

 

Looking beneath the surface, one finds that the so-called Japanese-Chinese “history issue” touted as the cause of the recent violent turn of events is in large part manufactured by the Chinese Communist Party.  It has far more to do with diplomatic maneuvering and contemporary politics than history per-se.

 

Contrary to popular Chinese contention, post-war Japan drew bitter lessons from the history of war and militarism and adopted a peaceable and democratic national foundation including the thorough rejection of militarism. Article 9 of Japan’s post-war Constitution, which bans the use of force except for pure self-defense of Japanese own territory, is representative. For the past 60 years, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces have never engaged in combat. Taking it to the extreme, even the SDF unit stationed in Iraq needs to be protected by the Dutch and Australian forces. This institutional constraint combined with strong aversion to militarism and things military among its people has made post-war Japan the single most pacifist nation in the world.

 

In the wake of the defeat of the World War, Japan accepted the judgment of the international War Crime Tribunals that resulted in punishment of tens of thousands of Japanese citizens accused of war crimes, including the execution of over 1,000.  Furthermore, Japan paid enormous amount of war reparation to the countries in Asia.  Japan also provided China over 60 billion dollars of economic assistance, even though China’s Communist and Nationalist governments both renounced the right to demand formal reparations.  This part of “history” China chooses to ignore.

 

Domestically, too, the Chinese government has chosen not to inform its own people about post-war Japan. Chinese history textbooks, while providing mountains of teachings, much of them uncorroborated, about Japanese atrocities and cruelties, ignore Japan’s aid to post-war China and teach virtually nothing about the post-war Japan.  A senior high school textbook titled “Chinese Modern History”, for example, that covers nearly 8 decades up to the 1990’s devotes 9 out of 23 chapters to the “anti-Japanese struggles” but gives merely a two line sentence to the entire 6 decades of post-war Japan. Official teaching guidance explicitly instructs teachers to “provide students with the catalyst for keeping strong hatred and grudge against crimes of aggression committed by the Japanese imperialists,” thus encouraging younger generations to maintain hostilities against contemporary Japan. In the same vein, the state-controlled media has avoided reporting on peaceable and friendly activities of its neighbor, Japan.

 

The Chinese diagnosis of Japanese attitudes toward history is always unilateral. The historical “frame of reference” has only been dictated by the Chinese side.  Any Japanese attempt to provide a more objective frame of historical reference has been automatically labeled as “an effort to whitewash past wrongs.” Japanese efforts simply to point out factual errors and inconsistencies in the Chinese version of history meet with the same perfunctory reaction.

 

China also portrays Mr.Koizumi’s visit to Japan’s Yasukuni Shrine as an act of glorifying past aggression and of reviving militarism.  It is unfortunate that China has missed the point.  Mr. Koizumi, in fact on every visit, has denounced militarism and past aggression and expressed remorse.  The shrine is a memorial to 2.5 million Japanese who died serving their country throughout its modern history, not just during WWII.  Visiting the shrine is a pacifist gesture purely domestic in nature.  Inclusion of the names of 14 Class A war criminals among the enshrined souls derives from the custom of seeking forgiveness for the deceased’s soul, not for promoting war. China, however, completely ignores this aspect and continues to accuse Japan in ways comparable to denouncing American political leaders’ visit to the tomb of General Robert E. Lee of the Confederacy as an act of trying to revive slavery.  China’s criticism of certain Japanese history textbooks conveys a similar distortion based on its own one-sided frame of reference.

 

In the meantime, while Japanese political leaders may continue to apologize to China out of somewhat misplaced habit of acknowledging historical guilt and avoiding confrontation, the public has noticed that China’s leaders never move on.  China’s current dogged refusal to apologize for encouraging and allowing violent anti-Japanese demonstrations is but the most recent example.  A national poll conducted in Japan soon after the Koizumi-Hu meeting showed that 71% of the respondents rejected the Chinese demand on history.  The Japanese public is recognizing that the so-called “history issue” has far less to do with truth than with the Chinese Communist Party’s objective of keeping Japan as the convenient villain for its own political reasons.  It is time China takes note.




.国際  投稿日:2015/5/11

[古森義久]【アメリカ人学者たちの傲慢と偏見】~研究者ら187名による「日本の歴史家を支持する声明」~


古森義久(ジャーナリスト/国際教養大学 客員教授)

「古森義久の内外透視」

執筆記事プロフィールBlog


もし日本の一群の歴史学者たちがアメリカのオバマ大統領に書簡を送り、「アメリカ全体として過去の過ちを反省や清算することが大切だ」などと言明したら、 どうなるだろうか。他国の元首に特定の言動を求め、その国の国民全体にも、「反省や清算」を要求するなどというのは、そもそも学問の世界を離れてのなまぐ さい政治活動だとされるだろう。他国の国のあり方や心の持ち方にあれこれ文句をつけるという傲慢さの非常識を厳しく責められるだろう。


しかしアメリカの歴史学者たちは、日本に対して平然とそんな行動を取るのである。日本の大手新聞各紙が5月7、8日に報道した「日本研究者187人 の声明」がそれだ。慰安婦問題での長年の日本糾弾で知られるコネチカット大学の歴史学者アレクシス・ダデン教授らが中心となり、安倍晋三首相にも直接に 送ったという声明である。


声明は要するに慰安婦問題で日本の態度や心のあり方をあれこれ指示しているのだ。具体的には「日本政府が過去の植民地支配と戦時の侵略の問題に立ち 向かう」とか「過去の過ちについて全体的で偏見のない清算をする」など、要するに高所からお説教である。特定の政治的な立場の押し付けでもある。


日本について研究しているというアメリカやイギリスの学者、研究者が主体だが、アメリカやイギリスの「過去の植民地支配と戦時の侵略」というテーマ はどうなのだろう。この両国は植民地支配と他国への軍事攻撃という意味での侵略は数え切れないほど重ねてきた。自国の元首に同じ要求をぶつけたらどうだろ うか。


そもそもアメリカの日本研究者とはなんなのだろう。単なる研究者、学者ではないか。選挙によって選ばれた議員でも元首から任命された官僚でもない。 アメリカの国民を代弁する立場にもない。そんな人たちが数を頼んで、圧力をかけるように、日本国や日本国民に向って命令や指導をするのである。日本はいつ も特定の考え方を保たねばならないと強圧する思想警察のようでもある。敗戦後の日本を占領したGHQ(連合軍総司令部)のメンタリティーさえ感じさせる。


かつての歴史ではアメリカになにからなにまで支配される中南米のバナナ生産国が「バナナ・リパブリック(共和国)」と、なかば侮蔑的に呼ばれることがあった。今回のアメリカ人学者たちの高圧的な指示は日本をバナナ共和国扱いしているともいえる。


予想どおり朝日新聞はこの声明を金科玉条のように大々的かつ賞賛をにじませて報道した。慰安婦問題での朝日新聞の特定の政治的主張に合致するところがあるからだろう。


日本はアメリカの防衛力に依存しているとはいえ、精神的な植民地でも属国でもない。たかが外国の研究者、学者の集団に国のあり方を命令される立場に はないのである。この基本原則は日米両国が第二次大戦での敗者と勝者だったという歴史の重みを越えての戦後70年の現実なのだといえる。


前回の当サイトにJason Morgan 氏の意見を載せさせていただきました。
その際の見出しはHonest Abe でした。

ここで改めて安倍晋三首相に対するアメリカ左派学者たちへの反論を今回は私自身の見解として
載せることにしました。

もう9年ほど前に私自身がNew York Times の依頼を受けて、寄稿した論文です。
その当時と現在と、アメリカ左派のゆがんだ状況があまりにも変わっていないことは驚きです。
しかしそれ以上に驚きなのは、アメリカと日本の両国全体の状況はあまりにも健全になった事実です。
アメリカ左派の安倍叩きも、すっかり勢いを失ってしまった。論理の破綻、事実の不在、偏見の実態など
があらわになったといえましょう。
Op-Ed Contributor

Who’s Afraid of Shinzo Abe?

Published: September 30, 2006

Washington


LAST Tuesday, Japan’s Parliament elected Shinzo Abe as its youngest prime minister since World War II. Some critics in Japan have called him a “hawkish nationalist,” but in fact, he — like the nearly 80 percent of Japanese also born after the war — has merely been shaped by democracy.


Mr. Abe in particular was also influenced by the course of Japan’s alliance with America. In 1960, the 6-year-old Shinzo Abe sat on the lap of his grandfather, Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, while thousands marched outside demonstrating against the first full-fledged security treaty between Japan and the United States. It was Nobusuke Kishi who guided Japan into the treaty, and opposition was fierce. Mr. Abe recalls that his grandfather remained calm while explaining to him that teaming up with America would be the best course for the Japanese people.


Forty-six years later, few Japanese would deny the wisdom of the alliance or the benefits it has brought Japan. The experience also taught Mr. Abe the value of having a long-term vision and the will to see it through.


Mr. Abe, as a junior politician, was catapulted from relative anonymity to national popularity by principled challenges to the status quo. In the early 1990’s he challenged the government by investigating the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea and supporting the efforts of their families to bring them home. Later, he was among the first Japanese political leaders to criticize China on issues of democracy and human rights.


In the wake of 9/11, Mr. Abe led the parliamentary effort to authorize cooperation with the United States’ war on terrorism. On all these issues, he initially encountered significant opposition within Japan, but ultimately won strong support from the majority of Japanese.


A significant part of Japan’s baggage over the last 61 years is related to its activities in China during the war. Although Japan accepted all judgments of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal and other regional war tribunals, and signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty, China in particular has aggressively pushed viewpoints that inflate and contradict those judgments. For years, Japan’s government stayed quiet to avoid denunciations of “whitewashing.”


Mr. Abe, while openly acknowledging and expressing remorse for Japan’s wartime mistakes and atrocities, was among the first politicians to question government silence on these escalating emotional and uncorroborated claims, and to point out that Japan’s postwar prime ministers have formally apologized to China more than 20 times for Japan’s wartime transgressions. Mr. Abe has said one of the new government’s priorities is improved relations with China, but noted that “it takes two to reconcile.” He looks forward to a China that can accept today’s democratic Japan.


For most of the postwar era, the Japanese sense of national identity was suppressed and condemned inside Japan. The flag and national anthem were kept out of schools and expressing pride in Japan was deemed “dangerous.” No one denies this was a result of the tragic and reckless war into which Japan’s misguided government had plunged the country.


But it went too far. Now, without forgetting the lessons of history, and with popular support, the government is swinging the pendulum from its post-war extreme toward the center.


The “hawkish nationalist” label has been adopted by some members of the Western press who seem uncomfortable leaving behind the 20th century and acknowledging Japan’s solid democracy, and likely derives from Mr. Abe’s willingness to tackle yet another postwar taboo: constitutional reform.


The Abe government’s plan to revise the Constitution is intended to fill gaping holes in national security. The postwar Constitution drafted by the American occupation authority imposed appropriate constraints meant to prevent Japan from rebuilding as a military power, but these constraints now impede legitimate national defense and peacekeeping activities.


Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, sent to Iraq as international peacekeepers, could not engage in combat under the Constitution; they had to be protected by Dutch and Australian forces. Nor could Japan help if America were attacked anywhere except on Japanese territory. North Korea’s recent missile launches over Japan, and China’s military expansion, including violations of Japan’s airspace and territorial waters, have only heightened the national feeling of vulnerability and now drive public support for constitutional revision.

Adhering to his grandfather’s advice, Mr. Abe will keep Japan’s future defense firmly within the framework of its alliance with the United States. Americans, Republicans and Democrats alike, will find the popular new prime minister thoroughly modern and straightforward, and a trustworthy friend.


Yoshihisa Komori is the Washington correspondent and editor at large for the Japanese daily Sankei Shimbun.


アメリカの19人の歴史学者が慰安婦問題について日本側の主張を非難する声明を出したことは、日本ではすでに広く知られています。

日本側の主張というのはアメリカのマグロウヒル社の教科書に慰安婦についての虚構の日本誹謗の記述があったことに対し訂正を求めたという趣旨です。

ところがそれに対しコネチカット大学のアレクシス・ダデン教授らは日本側の主張を「学問の自由の抑圧」などと断じて、事実の検証を拒むのです。この主張はアメリカ歴史学会(AHA)の機関誌に載りました。

このダデン氏らの主張への痛烈な批判がフルブライト学者の日本歴史研究者のジェイソン・モーガン氏Mr. Jason Morganから表明されました。同じAHA機関誌への投稿という形をとっています。

同機関誌がこの投稿を載せるかどうかまだ不明です。その前にモーガン氏のその投稿論文の全文をここに掲載します。正しい主張をできるだ早く、できるだけ多くの人に知らせるためです。

以下はモーガン氏の意見です。

Friday, May 1st, 2015

 

Dear AHA Editor,

 

I noted with much sadness the letter signed by nineteen American historians of Japan published in March. I have profited from many of these historians’ work, but in this case their hasty coalition reveals the powerful orthodoxies that constrain historical writing in general, thus warranting an outsiders’ response. I also hope here to repair some of the damage done by their attack on the Japanese government.

 

Missing from the letter’s papal bull-like dogmatics is a nuanced consideration of fact. To correct this lacuna, I humbly recommend Prof. Hata Ikuhiko’s Ianfu to senjō no sei, which eschews presentist politics in favor of documentary evidence. (Even the American historians’ own referee, Yoshimi Yoshiaki, has said publicly that he could find no evidence of the forced recruitment of women in Korea, putting Yoshimi in agreement with Hata.)

 

Furthermore, the Americans fail to note that in 2014 the Asahi Shimbun formally apologized for years of untenable ianfu reporting by Uemura Takashi, whose mother-in-law is the main comfort-woman activist in Korea. The Asahi falsehoods, in turn, mirrored the sordid confabulations of novelist Yoshida Seiji, who conjured up wild scenes of sexual enslavement on Jeju Island. When Prof. Hata investigated and found Yoshida’s claims baseless, Yoshida admitted he had made it all up. It took some twenty years, but eventually even the Asahi followed suit.

 

The American scholars, though, vow never to retract. Such vows are easier when one can cavalierly dismiss all contrary opinion as “conservative” or “rightwing.” One does not expect much rigorous debate from the same academy that brought us “micro-aggressions” and “trigger warnings,” and this is no exception. Indeed, “conservative” and “rightwing” are clear signals, like the old Graecum est, non legitur in the margins of vellum manuscripts, that something is a priori out of bounds and not to be taken seriously. Hazel Motes founded the Church Without Christ; likewise, on the comfort women issue, the American academy now proudly specializes in History Without Facts.

 

The obverse of this manufactured consensus is the inevitable charge of “revisionism.” In a sealed episteme, though, revisionism is all we’ve got. Either you are working within the anthill, or you are an invader from the outside. It is a dizzying tautology: the academy laboriously weeds out all opposition, and then compares the skeptical to Holocaust deniers. This shock-and-awe ringisho style of enforced consensus building is certainly good at getting everyone either to agree on something or else find another job, but the conclusions thus reached are hardly convincing to those who want something more than mere argument from authority (or from democratic majority, which amounts to the same thing). Not everyone works this way, of course; I personally know many historians who are models of dispassionate scholarship, but outing the objective-minded seems tantamount to escorting Moses to the edge of the Sinai. In any event, the enforced silence within the American academy, in comparison with the buzzing and jousting in Japan, is telling one way or another. Perhaps we can just chalk it up to blinding nationalism, but that cuts both ways, too.

 

Many of the letter writers themselves have probably experienced the lively Japanese academy under the sponsorship of the same Japanese government that they now accuse of practicing Turkey- and Russia-like intimidation. The Americans’ outrage over two moth-eaten paragraphs thus sounds more than a little out of tune. After several silent decades of enduring the Ienaga Saburō-school of historical sanctimony, the Japanese government meekly requested a meeting with the publisher of a fictionalized textbook. Why cry “censorship” over such a harmless—and long-overdue—request? Doesn’t anyone besides the nineteen self-appointed ephors and those in their anthill get to have any historical say?

 

The irony lies in how well this is all playing in Beijing and Seoul—both strongholds of actual censorship. The Chinese communist dictatorship needs no introduction on this score, and South Korea, for its part, recently released Katō Tatsuya, a journalist whose crime was repeating an unflattering rumor about President Park Geun-hye’s personal life. It is unthinkable, by contrast, that Uemura Takashi should face detention in Japan for his reporting. May we really equate a lone request for a meeting with what the PRC and the ROK do as a matter of quotidian policy?

 

We shall see if a quixotic graduate student can find a job in the “all things considered” American academy after a letter like this one. Perhaps. But even the great Prof. Hata was subjected to shameful persiflage when he delivered a scholarly talk at Princeton University, so the Japanese academy, it seems to me, is the far better place in which to work.

 

We shall also see if, someday, a Japanese historian looks back and congratulates the American academy for seeing the IMTFE narrative in its death throes and magnanimously embracing defeat. In any event, in 2015, it is the Japanese academy that ought to be giving the lecture on historical inquiry.

 

Sincerely,

 

Jason Morgan


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